Edith Cowan University

Research Online
Research outputs 2022 to 2026
2022

Toward a synthesis of the board-strategy relationship: A literature
review and future research agenda
Pieter-Jan Bezemer
Edith Cowan University, p.bezemer@ecu.edu.au

Amedeo Pugliese
Gavin Nicholson
Alessandro Zattoni

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks2022-2026
Part of the Business Commons
10.1111/corg.12481 Bezemer, P. J., Pugliese, A., Nicholson, G., & Zattoni, A. (2022). Toward a synthesis of the
board‐strategy relationship: A literature review and future research agenda. Corporate Governance: An International
Review. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12481
This Journal Article is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks2022-2026/1005

Received: 27 February 2021

Revised: 17 June 2022

Accepted: 1 July 2022

DOI: 10.1111/corg.12481

REVIEW ARTICLE

Toward a synthesis of the board-strategy relationship:
A literature review and future research agenda
Pieter-Jan Bezemer1
Alessandro Zattoni

|

Amedeo Pugliese2,3

|

Gavin Nicholson4

|

5

1

School of Business & Law, Edith Cowan
University, Perth, Western Australia, Australia

Abstract

2

Research Question/Issue: The strategy role of the board of directors is a contentious

Department of Economics and Management,
Università degli Studi di Padova, Padova, Italy
3

Department of Economics and Business,
Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain
4
School of Accountancy, Queensland
University of Technology, Brisbane,
Queensland, Australia
5
Department of Business and Management,
LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, Italy

Correspondence
Pieter-Jan Bezemer, School of Business & Law,
Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western
Australia, Australia.
Email: p.bezemer@ecu.edu.au
Funding information
Università degli Studi di Padova, Grant/Award
Number: Internal research grant

topic in both theory and practice and the debate on what boards should or should
not do around firm strategy has intensified with changes in global corporate governance. Boards face interventionist regulatory developments, calls for changes in their
composition, growing owner engagement, and societal questioning on the corporation's very purpose. With this review, we aim to assess how the research agenda in
this area has evolved with these developments.
Research Findings/Results: Our analysis of 152 articles published in 45 high-quality
journals between 2008 and 2020 reveals that the board-strategy literature remains
dominated by traditional input–output approaches using archival data. There are,
however, some green shoots opening up the debate by recognizing the importance
of the firm's specific context, applying alternative or complementary theoretical
lenses, exploring the underlying dynamics and processes, and using more sophisticated modeling techniques.
Theoretical implications: We identify three research directions with the potential to
advance the research agenda, namely, untangling the complex, multilevel interplay
between stakeholders involved in the strategy process, embracing the processual and
temporal nature of the board-strategy relationship, and unpacking the impact of
social context to understand when boards matter for strategy.
Practical implications: Our results indicate that the strategy role of the board is
evolving and broadening. Most notably the integration of CSR-related themes into
the board-strategy debate, and the leveraging of board diversity in strategic decisionmaking appear to be important issues for contemporary boards.
KEYWORDS

corporate governance, board of directors, strategy, literature review
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I N T RO DU CT I O N

organizations face increasing pressure from stakeholders to produce a
positive long-term impact on the societies in which they are

The strategy role of the board has garnered considerable attention

embedded. The social and environmental concerns are prompting

both from research (Judge & Talaulicar, 2017; Pugliese et al., 2009)

firms to revisit their corporate purpose (Flammer & Ioannou, 2021;

and practice (McKinsey, 2016). Initially, researchers sought to tackle

Zattoni & Pugliese, 2021) and to change their board composition

two key questions: (i) Whether boards should be involved in strategy

(e.g., increasing diversity, independence, the separation between chair

and, if so, (ii) how much they actually were involved in strategic

and CEO, and use of board committees). Since boards and directors

decision-making (Fama & Jensen, 1983a; Stiles, 2001). The first ques-

are at the forefront of managing and addressing such expectations,

tion has largely been answered as it is widely accepted that contribut-

these changes may have important implications for board objectives

ing to strategy formulation and control is one of the primary roles of

and measures of strategic success. For example, boards may increas-

the board (Adams, 2017; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Both scholars and

ingly include environmental and social KPIs alongside traditional

practitioners acknowledge directors' legal obligations to determine

accounting and financial measures.

the organization's long-term direction (Adams et al., 2010; Hendry

While recent studies have started to adopt different methodolo-

et al., 2010). Consequently, boards are also increasingly considered

gies (e.g., Machold & Farquhar, 2013; Walrave et al., 2015), incorpo-

accountable for their firm's performance (Kim et al., 2009; Klarner

rate context (e.g., Garg & Eisenhardt, 2017; Heyden et al., 2015),

et al., 2021; Nahum & Carmeli, 2020).

gather data concerning board strategic decision-making (e.g., Klarner

A significant body of academic work contributes to the second

et al., 2020; Meyfroodt & Desmidt, 2021; Tuggle et al., 2010), and

question by exploring how and when boards contribute to strategic

explore the nexus between boards and wider strategy developments

decision-making (Deutsch, 2005; Johnson et al., 1996; Westphal &

(e.g., Chen et al., 2016; Dalla Via & Perego, 2018; Helfaya &

Garg, 2021; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). However, despite this effort,

Moussa, 2017), it is unclear if and how the field has systematically

existing systematic literature reviews are critical of the field's pro-

advanced our understanding of the evolution of the boards' strategy

gress. Specifically, previous reviews suggest that academic work is dis-

role. For instance, has increased environmental turbulence changed

tant from the phenomenon of interest and may not reflect the

how boards engage in strategy, and has a strong emphasis on risk

changing nature of board involvement in strategy. For example, Pugli-

management, compliance, and financial information inadvertently

ese et al. (2009, p. 292) called for additional studies “to examine the

shifted the focus of boards away from strategy? Given the growing

impact of institutional and context-specific factors on the (expected)

research around the topic, it appears timely to review the more

contribution of boards to strategy, and to apply alternative methods

recent literature and critically reflect on the direction in which the

to fully capture the impact of board processes and dynamics on strat-

field has been developing. Accordingly, our research question is:

egy making.” Similarly, Judge and Talaulicar (2017, p. 139) noted that

What are the significant developments evident in recent board-

“we need a balanced approach in our research designs and currently

strategy research?

there are too many research designs relying on archival data that infer

To answer this research question, we identified and coded

actual board behavior.” It is unclear whether more recent research

152 articles published on boards and strategy in 45 high-quality jour-

addresses these challenges. After decades of academic effort, is there

nals between 2008 and 2020. We used the year 2008 as the starting

any more clarity around the board-strategy relationship, or does it

point of our inquiry, as (i) during that time the global financial crisis

remain clouded?

significantly reshaped the governance landscape around the globe,

Updating our understanding of the board's role in strategy is

and (ii) the literature review by Pugliese et al. (2009) captured the

important as boards likely adapt their approach to strategy in

developments in the debate up to that point. By analyzing this body

response to impactful environmental shifts. The past two decades

of research, we contribute to previous reviews on the topic in two

have seen a range of such changes. First, large-scale accounting frauds

important ways. First, a critical evaluation of the literature highlights

(e.g., Enron, Parmalat, Tyco, and WorldCom), and the unexpected col-

that while research interest in the subject continues to grow, there

lapse of financial institutions (e.g., Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and

are several major gaps hampering a fuller development of the field.

Merrill Lynch) during the global financial crisis, prompted a series of

Our analysis of four broad research clusters evident in current

regulatory changes that fundamentally alter directors' duties and

research suggests—at a higher level—a need for better conceptualiza-

board standards. These changes emphasize the role of director inde-

tion and more precise measurement of (i) the role and impact of the

pendence and board monitoring (Cuomo et al., 2016; Financial

board as part of a wider group of strategic decision-makers, (ii) the

Reporting Council, 2018), potentially affecting directors' involvement

process and temporal mechanisms explaining the connections

into strategy (Bezemer et al., 2007; Du Plessis, 2008). A second shift

between inputs and outputs, and (iii) the importance of “context,”

relates to changes in ownership structures resulting from growing

within or outside corporations. Since addressing these challenges will

institutional investors' activism and the internationalization of share-

require innovative research designs, our review points to ways in

holders bases (Filatotchev et al., 2020; Franks, 2020). These changes

which both quantitative and qualitative studies might enrich the

may fundamentally alter the board's strategic role, as large institu-

debate.

tional investors have the power and motivation to promote new stra-

Second, our review suggests that the strategy role of the board is

tegic directions or to monitor the board's strategic decisions. Third,

evolving following recent social and business-related trends. Most

3
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notably, there is a growing body of research documenting (i) the inte-

adopted this approach as the broadening and fragmentation of the

gration of CSR-related themes into the board-strategy debate and

strategy field (Durand et al., 2017; Volberda, 2004) made it difficult to

(ii) the advantages and challenges associated with increasing board

define the board-strategy phenomenon more precisely. However,

diversity. Interestingly, far less research has been conducted on both

given the broad nature of the search criteria, we retrieved many arti-

the board-owners interface and how boards engage with the purpose

cles that were not directly relevant. All articles were screened and we

of corporations. This signals that while scholars have started to exam-

removed those that (i) used the search terms with an entirely different

ine the impact of key macro-phenomena (i.e., regulation, societal

meaning (e.g., used the word “board” with a different meaning or in

expectations, and stakeholder roles), there is significant scope for a

relation to a different context), (ii) only referred to directors or board

deeper conversation between theory and practice to fully understand

members because they were the study participants, or (iii) had firm

the nature of boards' work in contemporary societies.

performance, efficiency, or productivity as the focal interest but did
not refer to a defined set of strategic outcomes or processes (e.g., De
Andrés-Alonso et al., 2010). We also excluded all literature reviews

2 | S C O P E OF TH E R E V I E W A N D A P P L I E D
ANALYTICAL APPROACH

and meta-analyses (e.g., Schepker et al., 2017) as they are not original
research articles. Conceptual papers were also not included in our
review due to the absence of empirical testing. This initial screening

To address our research questions, we conducted a comprehensive

process yielded 344 potential articles of interest for the period

and systematic review of the recent literature on boards and strat-

2008–2020.

egy following state-of-the-art approaches (Aguinis et al., 2018;

Three scholars coded these 344 articles for inclusion or exclu-

Parmigiani & King, 2019). Specifically, we adopted the broader

sion. Two of the coders were authors and a third was a highly quali-

guidelines in the literature (e.g., Schnatterly et al., 2018; Simsek

fied research assistant with a PhD in Economics and prior experience

et al., 2021) to expand two review articles on the topic

in meta-analysis and literature reviews. As a first step, all three

(i.e., Judge & Talaulicar, 2017; Pugliese et al., 2009). In the next sec-

coders agreed on a series of inclusion or exclusion criteria. The inclu-

tions, we describe our methodological choices and specific inclusion

sion criteria were that “boards” and/or “directors” and “strategy”

decisions made while collecting and analyzing data and reporting

were identifiable constructs in the article, and these constructs were

the results.

studied in a governance context, even if that was not the focus of
the study. With criteria agreed, the first set of 276 articles (from the
“Business and Management” category in JCR) were double coded for

2.1

|

Selection procedure for source articles

inclusion or exclusion: The research assistant coded all 276 articles
(Coder 1), and two authors (Coders 2 and 3) coded half of the articles

The first critical choice was the selection of relevant sources. Fol-

each. In 224 out of 276 cases (81.1%), there was agreement around

lowing previous governance reviews (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2020;

the inclusion or exclusion of the article. We resolved disagreements

Pugliese et al., 2009), we focused on peer-reviewed journal articles

on the remaining 52 articles in the following way: Coder 1 reviewed

and excluded books, book chapters, conference contributions, com-

her initial decisions, whereas Coders 2 and 3 assessed the articles

mentaries, and other nonrefereed publications. We selected our

that were not initially assigned to them. As a result of this process,

sample of journals from multiple sources. First, we used the Web of

Coder 1 switched (confirmed) opinion in 46 (six) of the 52 cases,

Science Journal Citation Reports (JCR) database to identify journals

whereas Coders 2 and 3 switched (confirmed) the previous coding in

that were listed in the “Business and Management,” “Business

six (46) cases. This is somewhat expected given that Coders 2 and

Finance,” and “Economics” categories. Second, we complemented

3 have longer experience and acquaintance with the relevant litera-

this selection with the list of journals promoted by the Chartered

ture than Coder 1. After the second round of coding, the coders

Association of Business Schools (CABS-2018) and the Financial

agreed on 48 of the 52 disagreements. In the remaining four cases,

Times' “FT50” list to balance the geographical representation of

given that all three coders had expressed a view on the paper, we

journals (Aguinis et al., 2018). Third, to focus on journals of recog-

followed a majority wins rule (e.g., 2 to 1) to determine the inclusion

nized academic reputation (Baldacchino et al., 2015), we limited our

or exclusion of the relevant article. The remaining 76 articles

results to journals either ranked 3 or more by CABS-2018 or fea-

(from the “Business Finance,” and “Economics” categories in JCR)

tured in the FT50 ranking. By adopting this selection procedure, we

were added later as part of the review process following peer

aimed to strike a balance between adhering to minimum quality

review. Coders 2 and 3 followed the same coding process using the

standards, while not being too narrow and elitist in defining high-

calibrated inclusion criteria.

quality journals.

At the end of this coding process, we retained 152 articles pub-

Next, building on Pugliese et al. (2009), we searched for articles

lished in the 45 journals identified in Table 1 (see Appendix S1 for

published in these journals featuring the expressions “director AND

the list of articles). The journals with the highest number of contri-

strateg*” or “board AND strateg*” in the abstract, key words, and/or

butions were the specialized journals Strategic Management Journal

titles. We used these broad search terms to identify those articles that

(20 articles) and Corporate Governance: An International Review

explicitly labeled themselves as part of the board-strategy debate. We

(19 articles).
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TABLE 1

Number of articles published per journal included in the analysis (N = 152)

Name of journal

Articles

Name of journal

Articles

Strategic Management Journal

20

Journal of Financial Economics

2

Corporate Governance: An International Review

19

Journal of Small Business Management

2

Business Strategy & The Environment

12

Management International Review

2

Academy of Management Journal

9

Research Policy

2

Long Range Planning

7

Abacus

1

British Journal of Management

6

Accounting Horizons

1

Organization Science

6

Accounting Review

1

R&D Management

5

American Economic Journal

1

Journal of Corporate Finance

4

Business History

1

Journal of Management Studies

4

European Journal of Finance

1

Administrative Science Quarterly

3

Family Business Review

1

Global Strategy Journal

3

Financial Analysts Journal

1

Human Resource Management

3

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy

1

Int Journal of Human Resource Management

3

Journal of Business Venturing

1

International Small Business Journal

3

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

1

Journal of Management

3

Journal of International Management

1

Review of Quantitative Finance & Accounting

3

Journal of Organizational Behaviour

1

Strategic Organization

3

MIT Sloan Management Review

1

European Management Review

2

Organization Studies

1

Financial Management

2

Public Management Review

1

Harvard Business Review

2

Small Business Economics

1

Journal of Banking & Finance

2

Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal

1

Journal of Business Research

2

2.2

|

Coding of articles

30 randomly selected articles. For these 30 articles, there were
123 instances of agreement (i.e., 82%) over the 150 coding decisions.1

Next, we coded the content of all 152 articles. Development of the

To ensure convergence, we compared the open-coded assessments

coding regime had two objectives (Aguinis et al., 2018): (i) To allow

of the two coders. Disagreements were discussed to resolve different

coders capturing the most relevant features of an article by trading

understandings of the schema and fine-tune the coding approach.

off completeness and manageability and (b) to allow coders to reach

Also, one of the authors (not coding a subset of articles) assessed and

a consensus. The coding was undertaken in three phases. A first

resolved potential conflicts. Once the coding scheme was agreed and

(preliminary) phase saw all three coders follow a semistructured

“probated” for 39 articles, we moved to the third phase where two

review of the same nine randomly selected articles. Each coder

coders separately analyzed each of the remaining 113 articles. Con-

reviewed the articles against the main categories and subcategories

sensus was reached for 80.5% of the items coded, and instances of

used by Pugliese et al. (2009) to ensure consistency with a previ-

disagreements were again discussed item-by-item, with reconciliation

ously published literature review on the topic. The coders then

prior to the thematic analysis.

revised the subcategories to capture the evolution of the literature
(Aguinis et al., 2018) and adjusted the coding scheme based on any
coding

disagreements.

Consistent

with

other

review

articles

2.3

|

Data analysis

(e.g., Brozovic, 2018), once consensus on how to code the individual (sub)categories was reached, coding of the full articles

The coded data were analyzed in two different ways. First, building on

commenced.

Pugliese et al. (2009), we examined whether articles published on

Table 2 reports the main coding categories, subcategories, and

boards and strategy after 2007 differed in terms of type, main topics,

relevant section(s) of the article from which we retrieved the informa-

theories, settings, and sources of data. Furthermore, we explored

tion. With consensus on the coding of the first nine articles, we estab-

whether there were temporal changes within our timeframe of 2008–

lished the level of convergence in the coding of the five main

2020. Second, we turned our attention to assessing how the 152 arti-

categories in each article. Based on the schemata developed in the

cles have advanced the research agenda from a content perspective.

previous phase, two scholars independently coded an additional

To this purpose, we used the “main topic” coding to create four

5
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TABLE 2

Coding scheme used for the analysis of articles

Main
category

Subcategories

Operationalization of the coding

1. Type of
article

• Empirical (quantitative)
• Empirical (qualitative)

• Article using quantitative data collection and analysis
techniques
• Article using qualitative data collection and analysis
techniques

Methodology

• Articles examining how boards shape corporate
strategy (e.g., internationalization, R&D, M&A, and
product diversification) and/or the associated
financial performance (e.g., ROA, stock price and
returns, and dividend distribution). The unit of
analysis is at firm-level.
• Articles examining which factors affect board
involvement in their strategy role. The unit of
analysis is at board-level.
• Articles examining how boards go about the
execution of their strategy responsibilities. The
unit of analysis is at board-level
• Articles examining how a boards strategy
responsibilities interact with wider firm-level
decisions issues and/or the strategic actions of
CEO/TMTs (e.g., hiring or firing of CEO,
remuneration, and disclosure). The unit of
analysis is either at firm-level or CEO/TMTlevel.

Introduction

2. Main
topic

3. Theories

4. Setting

5. Source of
data

• Strategic performance of the board
• Strategic involvement of the board
• Strategic decision-making of the board
• Broader governance studies

• Articles referring to economic/
management theories only
• Articles referring to psychological/
behavioral theories only
• Articles referring to a combination of
theories
• Articles without referring to theories

• Articles only using one of the following theories:
Agency, resource dependency, strategic choice,
social network, managerial hegemony, upper
echelon, stewardship and or stakeholder theory.
• Articles only using one of the following theories:
Cognitive, behavioral, social psychology, political,
or institutional theory.
• Articles using a combination of the two previous
subcategories.
• Articles not using any clearly identifiable theory
throughout.

Relevant section in
manuscripts

Literature & Theory
Section

• North American data only
• European data only
• Asian data only
• Other continents only
• Multiple continents

• Articles studying the North American governance
context only.
• Articles studying the European governance context
only.
• Articles studying the Asian governance context only.
• Articles studying the governance context of another
continent.
• Articles studying the governance context of multiple
continents.

Methodology

• Interviews
• Anecdotal evidence
• Archival data
• Survey
• Direct observations/process studies
• Experiments
• Multiple sources

• Articles using interviews as the main data source.
• Articles using anecdotal evidence as the main data
source.
• Articles using archival data as the main data source.
• Articles using survey evidence as the main data
source.
• Articles using action research as the main data source.
• Articles using experiments as the main data source.
• Articles using multiple data sources.

Methodology

distinct research clusters: (i) Studies investigating the effects of boards

governance phenomena affecting the board strategic role (n = 29).

on corporate strategy and performance (n = 94), (ii) studies examining

Several rounds of coding were used to group similar papers and estab-

board strategic involvement (n = 21), (iii) studies analyzing board stra-

lish subclusters within the initial four-cluster regime. The subclusters

tegic decision-making (n = 8), and (iv) studies assessing broader

were then thematically analyzed.

6
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R E V I E W O F T H E LI T E R A T U R E

North American data, significant research was based on European
(28%) and Asian (11%) data, and nine studies (6%) built on data from

Table 3 provides an overview of the 152 articles included in the litera-

various continents. Finally, most of the studies relied on archival data

ture review. As shown, most studies employed quantitative

(69%) with few (14%) utilizing multiple data sources (e.g., combining

approaches (89%), examined the impact of boards on firm-level strate-

interviews with other data sources). Overall, there were few differ-

gic or financial results (62%), and relied on management or economic

ences among articles published between 2001 and 2007 (see Pugliese

theories (48%), with agency theory being the framework most fre-

et al., 2009), 2008–2014, and 2015–2020. More recent articles differ

quently applied. While just under half (49%) of the work relied on

by having both a focus on broader governance phenomena, and a

2008–2014

2015–2020

Overall

73

79

152

10.43

13.17

11.69

Empirical—(mainly) quantitative

62 (85%)

74 (94%)

136 (89%)

Empirical—(mainly) qualitative

11 (15%)

5 (6%)

16 (11%)

Total

73 (100%)

79 (100%)

152 (100%)

Summary
Number of articles
Average number of articles per year
Type of article

Main research topic
Strategic performance of the board

47 (64%)

47 (59%)

94 (62%)

Strategic involvement of the board

11 (15%)

10 (13%)

21 (14%)

Strategic decision-making of the board

5 (7%)

3 (4%)

8 (5%)

Broader governance studies

10 (14%)

19 (24%)

29 (19%)

Total

73 (100%)

79 (100%)

152 (100%)

Articles referring to economics/management
theories

42 (58%)

31 (39%)

73 (48%)

Articles referring to psychological/behavioral
theories

7 (10%)

14 (18%)

21 (14%)

Articles referring to a combination of theories

19 (26%)

25 (32%)

44 (29%)

5 (7%)

9 (11%)

14 (9%)

73 (100%)

79 (100%)

152 (100%)

2.10

1.86

1.97

Articles based on North American data only

35 (49%)

39 (50%)

74 (49%)

Articles based on European data only

22 (31%)

20 (26%)

42 (28%)

Articles based on Asian data only

8 (11%)

9 (12%)

17 (11%)

Use of theories

Articles without referring to theories
Total
Average number of theories being referred to
Research setting

a

Articles based on data from other continents

4 (6%)

4 (5%)

8 (5%)

Articles based on data from multiple continents

3 (4%)

6 (8%)

9 (6%)

72 (100%)

78 (100%)

150 (100%)

Total
Sources of data

a

Interviews

6 (8%)

1 (1%)

7 (5%)

Anecdotal evidence

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Archival data

46 (63%)

59 (75%)

105 (69%)

Survey

9 (12%)

8 (10%)

17 (11%)

Direct observations/process studies

1 (1%)

1 (1%)

2 (1%)

Experiments

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Multiple sources

11 (15%)

10 (13%)

21 (14%)

Total

73 (100%)

79 (100%)

152 (100%)

Two studies are missing in these numbers, as one article did not disclose the research setting and one
article involved a simulation study without a specific research setting.

T A B L E 3 Overview of the
characteristics of the included studies

7

BEZEMER ET AL.

stronger reliance on archival data. Table 4 provides a summary of the

interface between these two groups, and how this will affect the

main findings of our analysis based on clusters and subclusters.

firm's strategic moves. Another group of studies conceptualizes the
relationship as “cooperative” and highlights how these two groups
can positively support each other, with the complementary human

3.1 | Research cluster 1: Strategic performance of
the board (n = 94)

and social capital of both groups driving firm strategic performance

Studies in the first research cluster primarily deal with how boards of

on “contestation” between boards and CEOs/TMTs will undermine

(e.g., Castro et al., 2009; Fernandez & Sundaramurthy, 2020). For
example, Faleye et al. (2011) in this context reveal that a strong focus

directors relate to firm-level strategic and/or financial outcomes. Most

the level of “cooperation” between the two groups, thus lowering firm

studies assume a direct impact of boards on key decisions and out-

value.

comes and acknowledge that contextual factors might shape board

A third group of studies in this first cluster (four out of 94) takes a

discretion (e.g., Heyden et al., 2015). A limited group of studies argues

behavioral approach and examines how governance orientations, pro-

that boards' contributions are more indirect, as boards enhance or

cesses, and dynamics shape firm-level outcomes. For example,

suppress firm-level decision-making (e.g., Bednar et al., 2013;

Coombes et al. (2011) highlight how the behavioral orientations of

Broadstock et al., 2019; Desai, 2016). Within this cluster, firm-level

NGO boards shape the performance of these organizations, while

outcomes are measured using both strategy-related variables

Tasavori et al. (2018) reveal that participative governance allows fam-

(e.g., strategic change, diversification, M&A activity, risk taking, and

ily firms to leverage internal social capital. Relatedly, Zattoni et al.

innovation) and traditional accounting and market-based performance

(2015) build on Forbes and Milliken's work (1999) to illustrate how

variables (e.g., ROA, IPO underpricing, performance volatility, and

board processes mediate the relationship between family involve-

sales growth). More recently, studies have also begun to explore how

ment, board strategy task performance, and financial performance.

boards affect firm environmental and social performance (e.g., García-

Instead of relying on archival data, these studies mainly use surveys to

Sánchez et al., 2021; Nadeem et al., 2020; Orazalin, 2020).

explore internal processes.

Three distinct subclusters emerged from our analysis. A first

In sum, studies in this research cluster generally show that the

group of studies (64 out of 94) focus on connecting board characteris-

way in which boards are set up—that is, their composition, structures,

tics (e.g., demographic, human capital, and social capital) to firm-level

processes, and dynamics—have a significant impact on firm strategic

outcomes. Studies often rely on economic theories (34), use archival

and financial performance. While most studies use a traditional

data (57), with a North American focus (28). In line with “global good

approach, the debate is shifting to explore (i) how contextual factors

governance norms” (Ponomareva et al., 2022), these studies suggest

shape these relationships (both within the firm and the wider institu-

that boards can have a positive impact on firm-level outcomes when

tional context), (ii) how the interaction between boards and other

composed of independent, skilled, connected, motivated, and diverse

organizational actors (i.e., CEOs/TMTs and/or owners) affects firm

directors. There are two caveats, though. First, these studies show

outcomes, and (iii) how boards shape the environmental and social

that board discretion is influenced and constrained by some factors,

performance of corporations. Open issues mainly center on whether

such as the firm strategic position (e.g., Albino-Pimentel et al., 2018;

boards and CEOs/TMTs have cooperative and/or conflicting relation-

Triana et al., 2014), relevant actors (such as executives and owners)

ships, whether the impact of boards on firm outcomes is direct and/or

(e.g., Chen & Lai, 2017; Oehmichen et al., 2017), and the board model

indirect, and what board composition (e.g., diversity and indepen-

(e.g., Heyden et al., 2015). Second, the size and the direction of the

dence) will yield an optimal integration of CSR-related issues in corpo-

effects are not consistent across studies. For example, studies investi-

rate strategic decision-making.

gating the impact of gender diversity on firm-level outcomes report a
range of different effects (e.g., positive, negative, or curvilinear)
(e.g., Chen et al., 2016; Chen & Kao, 2020; Elmagrhi et al., 2019; He &
Jiang, 2019; Nadeem et al., 2020; Triana et al., 2014).

3.2 | Research cluster 2: Strategic involvement of
the board (n = 21)

A second group of studies in this first cluster (26 out of 94)
focuses on the interplay between boards and CEOs/TMTs,2 and their

Studies in the second research cluster address the question of what

impact on firm-level outcomes. Most of these studies support a

shapes board strategic involvement. These studies assume that boards

mutual effect whereby boards and CEOs/TMTs interact and influence

must contribute to strategic decision-making and investigate what

each other. In this way, they show that the joint effect of boards and

enhances or hampers their contribution in this area. Most of these

CEOs/TMTs on firm-level outcomes is different from their individual

studies collect data via (i) surveys (e.g., Melkumov et al., 2015;

effects. However, there is little consensus about this effect. A group

Minichilli et al., 2009; Nielsen & Huse, 2010), (ii) interviews

of studies views the relationship as “contested,” as either CEOs/TMTs

(Hoppmann et al., 2019), and (iii) analysis of board minutes (Tuggle

(e.g., Devers et al., 2008; Estélyi & Nisar, 2016; Lim & McCann, 2013)

et al., 2010) to capture how boards perform their strategy task. The

or boards (e.g., Chen, 2011; Li & Tang, 2010; Yoo & Reed, 2015) con-

studies grouped in this cluster collect and analyze data from various

strain the strategic behaviors of the other. These studies generally

research contexts and use noneconomic theories to understand board

draw on the concept of power to predict both the nature of the

participation in strategy.

Coombes et al., 2011;
Shaikh et al., 2019;
Tasavori et al., 2018;
Zattoni et al., 2015

Board processes and
dynamics + board
characteristics (4)

Econ theory (3), econ
theory + psych theory (1)

Econ theory (14), psych
theory (2), econ theory +
psych theory (8), none (2)

Byrd et al., 2012;
Chen, 2011; Kim et al.,
2020; Li & Tang, 2010;
Zhu & Chen, 2015

Interface between board
and TMT/CEO
characteristics (26)

Theory approach
Econ theory (35), psych
theory (8), econ theory +
psych theory (14), none
(7)

Examples
Cao et al., 2019; Dalziel
et al., 2011; Greve & Man
Zhang, 2017; Lungeanu &
Zajac, 2019; Oehmichen
et al., 2017

Focus

Board characteristics (64)

Overview of research clusters in the board-strategy literature (2008–20)

Strategic
performance
of the board
(94)

Main topic

TABLE 4

North America (2), Europe
(1), other continent (1)

North America (17), Europe
(2), Asia (5),
multicontinents (1), N.A.
(1)

Survey (2), archival data
(1), multiple (1)

Survey (1), archival data
(24), process (1)

Board processes and
dynamics (e.g., board
conflict, use of
knowledge, orientation,
and strategic
involvement) influence
firm outcomes. Some of
these studies show
mediation effects.

Most of these studies show
that either (i) the board
constraints the
opportunistic decision by
CEOs/TMTs, or (ii) the
CEO constraints the
influence of board
characteristics on firm
strategic performance. A
small group of studies
notes more positive
interaction effects.

Findings
Board characteristics (board
human and social capital,
tenure, diversity,
independence) shape
firm-level outcomes.
Often these effects are
contingent on
characteristics of other
governance mechanisms
and/or the internal/
external environments.
The general impact and
direction of effects is not
always consistent across
studies/settings.

Data source
Survey (2), archival data
(58), multiple (4)

Research setting
North America (29), Europe
(17), Asia (10), other (4),
multicontinents (3), N.A.
(1)
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Strategic
decisionmaking of the
board (8)

Bailey & Peck, 2013;
Hoppmann et al., 2019;
Melkumov et al., 2015;
Zhang, 2010

Deman et al., 2018; Du
et al., 2015; Krause
et al., 2016

Garg & Eisenhardt, 2017;
Hermanson et al., 2020;
Klarner et al., 2020;
Zhang et al., 2011

Hendry et al., 2010;
Machold &
Farquhar, 2013;

Board processes and
dynamics (8)

Board characteristics (3)

Interface between board
and TMT/CEO (4)

Opening up the strategy
process black box (4)

Research setting

Europe (1), Other (3)

North America (2), Europe
(1), Multi-continents (1)

Econ theory + psych theory
(4)

Econ theory (2), psych
theory (1), econ theory +
psych theory (1)

North America (1), Europe
(2)

North America (2), Europe
(4), Asia (1), Multicontinents (1)

North America (2), Europe
(7), Multi-continents (1)

Econ theory (3)

Econ theory (3), psych
theory (2), econ theory +
psych theory (1), none (2)

Theory approach
Econ theory (2), psych
theory (3), econ theory +
psych theory (3), none (2)

Examples
Crucke & Knockaert, 2016;
Nielsen & Huse, 2010;
Tuggle et al., 2010

Focus

Board processes and
dynamics + board
characteristics (10)

(Continued)

Strategic
involvement of
the board (21)

Main topic

TABLE 4
Data source

Interviews (1) process
(1), multiple (2)

Multiple (4)

Survey (1), archival data
(1), multiple (1)

Survey (3), multiple (3),
interviews (2)

Survey (5), archival data
(2), multiple (2),
interviews (1)

Findings

(Continues)

There exists wide variation
in the ways in which
boards execute their
strategy role across time
and space.

While the boardmanagement interface
can be challenging (i.e.,
who owns firm strategy),
CEOs and boards can
undertake several steps
to harness the potential
value-add of directors in
strategy processes.

Board characteristics
(human and social capital,
nationality, and CEO
duality) influence board
strategic involvement.

Strategic board involvement
is shaped by board
processes and dynamics,
such as the use of
strategy plans, the
presence or use of
information, conflict,
organizational
identification, and chair
leadership.

These studies show that
processes and dynamics
(e.g., board open debate,
conflict, development,
meeting informality, and
learning) matter by
showing that process
affects the impact of
board characteristics on
board strategic
involvement.
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Econ theory (4), psych
theory (1), econ theory +
psych theory (2)

Econ theory (1), psych
theory (2), econ theory +
psych theory (5), none (1)

Alexandridis et al., 2019;
Gore et al., 2011; Graffin
et al., 2011; Shi
et al., 2019

Malhotra et al., 2018;
McDonald et al., 2008;
Oh & Barker, 2018; Zhu
et al., 2020

Studies showing how
boards shape CEO/TMT
strategic decisionmaking (9)

Theory approach
Econ theory (6), psych
theory (2), econ theory +
psych theory (5)

Board impact on firm-level
governance decisions (7)

Examples
Dalla Via & Perego, 2018;
Duplat et al., 2020;
Moore et al., 2012;
Mullins & Holmes, 2018;
Shoham et al., 2020

Focus

Board impact on wider firmlevel choices (i.e.,
disclosure, IPO location,
strategic HRM) (13)

(Continued)

Broader
governance
studies (29)

Main topic

TABLE 4
Research setting

North America (8), Europe
(1)

North America (6), Asia (1)

North America (5), Europe
(6), Multi-continents (2)

Data source

Survey (1), archival data
(5), multiple (3)

Archival data (6),
multiple (1)

Survey (2), archival data
(8), interviews (2),
multiple (1),

Findings

Some of these studies
shows how a CEOs board
network influences CEO
strategic actions and
decisions.

Most studies suggest that
board characteristics
have an impact on
governance decisions,
such as entrenchment
mechanisms, CEO and
CFO pay, and CEO
succession,

Both board characteristics
(e.g., duality,
independence and HR
expertise) and board
processes and dynamics
(e.g., meetings and board
orientation) shape wider
firm-level choices.
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A closer examination revealed the presence of three subclusters.

directors' activities and highlight the structural and temporal complex-

The first (10 out of 21) focuses on how board characteristics, together

ities associated with board strategic decision-making. One of the dis-

with board processes and dynamics, shape board strategic participa-

cerning features of this cluster relates to research design choices, with

tion. These studies adopt different approaches: Some modeled a

most studies (six out of eight) relying on a combination of interviews,

direct impact of board processes and dynamics (e.g., Minichilli

observations, and/or document analyses to better understand the

et al., 2009), while others view these constructs as mediators

strategy process. These studies also highlight the importance of con-

(e.g., Crucke & Knockaert, 2016; Gabaldon et al., 2018; Nielsen &

text by focusing on specific organizational settings, such as new ven-

Huse, 2010) and/or moderators (e.g., Tuggle et al., 2010) of the rela-

tures (e.g., Garg & Eisenhardt, 2017; Zhang et al., 2011) or nonprofit

tionship between board characteristics and board strategic involve-

organizations (e.g., Parker, 2008).

ment. Often board processes and dynamics are linked to directors'

The eight studies in this cluster can be broadly divided into two

human and social capital, as well as board information (e.g., Minichilli

foci. A first group (four studies) aims to enhance the understanding of

et al., 2009; Schønning et al., 2019). Studies in this subcluster provide

the interface between boards and CEOs/TMTs, raising questions

strong support for the notion that board processes and dynamics

around how these two groups of actors work together in reality. While

(such as open or critical debate, cognitive conflict, or meetings' infor-

some studies point to a complementary relationship (Garg &

mality) help to better understand when and how board characteristics

Eisenhardt, 2017;Klarner et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2011), others point

will trigger board strategic involvement.

to potential challenges around “who owns” strategy in the organization

The remaining two subclusters study either the influence of board

(Hermanson et al., 2020). While these studies are similar to some in

processes and dynamics (eight out of 21), or of board characteristics

research cluster 1 (i.e., they investigate the tension in the Board/CEO

(three out of 21), on board strategic involvement. These studies

relationship), studies in this cluster provide greater detail on the com-

largely support the insights of the previous subcluster in that they

plexities and intricacies surrounding the relationship between CEOs/

show that board processes and dynamics—such as the use of strategy

TMTs and boards, along with insights as to how this relationship might

plans (Meyfroodt & Desmidt, 2021), chair leadership (Bailey &

be improved. For example, this cluster points to the need for CEOs to

Peck,

actively manage the interface between boards and top managers

2013),

and

organizational

identification

(Melkumov

et al., 2015)—and board characteristics—such as the nationality of

(Garg & Eisenhardt, 2017), with some studies underlying the need to

directors (Du et al., 2015) and CEO duality (Deman et al., 2018)—

develop formal and informal interfaces to harness a board's strategic

shape the board contribution to strategy. Some studies also highlight

contributions (Klarner et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2011).

that boards might be falling short in their strategic performance

The second subgroup (four studies) examines the “black box” of

(Cossin & Metayer, 2015; Li et al., 2012; Sonnenfeld et al., 2013). For

the strategy process (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007). For example, Mac-

example, Cossin and Metayer (2015) suggest that boards need to

hold and Farquhar (2013) observed that boards are highly engaged in

reflect on how they view corporate strategy and conceptualize their

routine compliance, whereas strategy did not necessarily receive

strategy role and how both might be shaped by the specific context in

much board attention. Parker's (2008) observation of two boards of

which an organization is located.

nonprofit organizations suggests that their engagement in the control

In sum, the studies in this research cluster suggest that board

role differs with their directors' strategic orientations. Ratnatunga and

strategic involvement is a complex phenomenon that is shaped by a

Alam (2011) highlighted in their case study that a board of directors

variety of factors related to board composition, structures, processes,

can play an important role in the management of a company's perfor-

dynamics, and contexts. While this is an interesting area of develop-

mance through the strategic use of management accounting informa-

ment, at present there are limited studies positing specific relation-

tion. Finally, Hendry et al. (2010) highlighted that boards adopt a

ships; that is, specific insights depend on one or a few studies. In

variety of different board strategic decision-making approaches and

addition, few studies explore each combination of factors; that is, it is

that several board contingencies (such as the relative power of the

difficult to isolate the effects of specific factors related to board com-

board and the strategic orientation of directors) influence the choice

position, structure, dynamics, and processes, as well as the interaction

of their specific approach. Together, these studies show that there is

among them. Conceptually, challenges are also visible around how

variation around how boards of directors approach the execution of

board characteristics are linked to strategic involvement, as studies

their strategy role.

vary in whether they expect a direct and/or indirect impact
(as highlighted earlier).

In sum, this relatively small research cluster highlights the potential process challenges that arise as several different organizational
bodies are involved in the strategy process at the apex of the organization. It also highlights the variety of ways in which boards can par-

3.3 | Research cluster 3: Strategic decision-making
of the board (n = 8)

ticipate in strategic decision-making, thus inviting scholars to further
unpack the “multilevel, structural and temporal aspects” (Klarner
et al., 2020, p. 508) of board strategic decision-making. As such, these

Studies in this third research cluster focus on the strategy process

results echo both calls to study boards as “dynamic social systems”

itself, that is, the patterns of activity through which boards execute

(Lorsch, 2017, p. 2), and recent empirical efforts to accomplish this

their strategy task. Most of these studies provide thick descriptions of

(e.g., Bezemer et al., 2018; Veltrop et al., 2021).
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3.4 | Research cluster 4: Broader governance
studies (n = 29)

shaped by the board's networks, particularly those created by CEOs
participating in boards of other organizations, and not just the board's
own internal governance mechanisms.

Studies in the fourth research cluster adopt a more distal approach, as
they focus on how the board strategy role interacts with several firm
issues. These studies explore different topics, such as executive com-

4

|

S Y N T H E S I S A N D F U T U RE D I R E C T I O N S

pensation (Shi et al., 2019; Spraggon & Bodolica, 2011), CSR disclosures (Dalla Via & Perego, 2018; Helfaya & Moussa, 2017), joint

In light of calls to advance the field (Judge & Talaulicar, 2017;

venture contracts (Duplat et al., 2020), and CEOs' strategic behaviors

Lorsch, 2017; Pugliese et al., 2009; Westphal & Garg, 2021), the aim

(Malhotra et al., 2018; Zhu et al., 2020). Most of these studies origi-

of this review was to critically reflect on the evolution of the board-

nate from North America, use archival data, and establish links to

strategy literature following major changes in regulation, practice, and

management or economic theories.

expectations that occurred in the last two decades (Filatotchev

The 29 studies in this cluster can be broadly divided into three

et al., 2020; Flammer & Ioannou, 2021; Zattoni & Pugliese, 2021). To

subclusters. The first group of 13 studies focuses on the impact of

this purpose, we systematically analyzed the 152 articles published in

board characteristics (e.g., independence, gender diversity, duality,

45 high-quality journals during the period 2008–2020. Our results

and HR expertise) and board processes and dynamics (e.g., meetings,

show that research on the topic has intensified over the last 13 years,

attention for certain topics, and board orientation) on wider firm-level

moving from an average of 4.3 articles published yearly between

choices. For example, Dalla Via and Perego (2018) illustrate that

1972 and 2007 (see Pugliese et al., 2009) to an average of 11.7 arti-

boards that are more active and design long-term incentives for man-

cles between 2008 and 20. Our analysis identified four broad research

agers tend to disclose more environmental information. Similarly, Mul-

clusters, offering distinct contributions, using different theoretical and

lins (2018) observes that boards with HR experts tend to promote

methodological approaches, and having their own benefits and

diversity practices within the organization. Shoham et al. (2020)

challenges. The next section outlines our assessment of the state of

observe that gender diverse boards are less likely to cross-list compa-

the debate, before turning to avenues to advance the field.

nies. A second group of seven studies focuses on how boards influence the governance structures of organizations. Most of these
studies highlight how board vigilance and orientation will directly and
indirectly influence the remuneration of executives (Gore et al., 2011;

4.1 | The current state of the board-strategy
research agenda

Ji et al., 2020; Shi et al., 2019; Spraggon & Bodolica, 2011) and the
mechanisms used to retain top managers (Randolph et al., 2018). Both

Our review shows that important changes are visible in the ways

subclusters include several studies showing that board committees

scholars have examined the board-strategy relationship. First,

(Gore et al., 2011; Helfaya & Moussa, 2017; Main et al., 2008) and

responding to societal concerns, studies have broadened our under-

board ties (Duplat et al., 2020; Moore et al., 2012) influence firm-level

standing of the link between boards and firm-level social outcomes.

choices, thus highlighting the important role of formal and informal

This is especially—if not exclusively—visible in the research cluster 1.

social structures.

For example, scholars have started to examine the board's impact on

A third subgroup of studies adopts a different approach to exam-

CSR-related outcomes (e.g., García-Sánchez et al., 2021; Nadeem

ine how boards influence the strategic behaviors of CEOs/TMTs. For

et al., 2020; Orazalin, 2020) as well as governance-related decisions

example, McDonald et al. (2008) and McDonald and Westphal (2010)

(e.g., Gore et al., 2011; Mullins, 2018; Shi et al., 2019; Spraggon &

illustrate how board monitoring will influence the extent to which

Bodolica, 2011). Moreover, these studies have increasingly explored

CEOs will seek external strategic advice. Relatedly, Oh and Barker

the impact of board (mostly gender) diversity on firm-level outcomes

(2018), Tang et al. (2018), and Malhotra et al. (2018) highlight how the

(e.g., Chen et al., 2016; Chen & Kao, 2020; He & Jiang, 2019; Nadeem

board networks of CEOs moderate and mediate the impact that CEOs

et al., 2020; Triana et al., 2014). Second, although there is still signifi-

have on firm-level outcomes such as R&D, CSR, and M&As. Several of

cant heterogeneity, recent works adopted more sophisticated model-

these studies also propose that the impact of CEO networks varies

ing and statistical techniques to address issues of endogeneity and

based on key contingencies, such as environmental dynamics (Oh &

other methodological challenges affecting board-related strategy

Barker, 2018) and the level of managerial entrenchment (Malhotra

studies (e.g., Lungeanu & Zajac, 2019; Shi et al., 2019; Zhu

et al., 2018).

et al., 2020). Similarly, studies have started to use data closer to the

In conclusion, the studies in this cluster highlight that boards

board-strategy phenomenon (Klarner et al., 2020; Machold &

shape several of the intermediate choices in organizational decision-

Farquhar, 2013; Meyfroodt & Desmidt, 2021; Tuggle et al., 2010).

making that ultimately may affect the strategic and/or the financial

Third, a growing number of studies has explicitly used different

firm performance. The focus on specific intermediate decisions, that

theoretical perspectives—for example, tournament theory (Patel

are within the board's discretion, makes it easier to isolate the specific

et

impact of boards, as there is less “noise” in the measures used at the

Martin, 2011), and post-traumatic growth theory (Shi et al., 2017)—to

firm level. Interestingly, this cluster illustrates that firm strategy is also

address tensions and/or tease out the complexities surrounding the

al.,

2018),

portfolio

selection

theory

(Mínguez-Vera

&
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board-strategy relationship. Thus, this evolution of the approach to

(Leuz, 2018). Instead of this suggestion, when comparing 2008–2014

studying boards and strategy highlights how scholars have responded

with 2015–2020, we have witnessed a reduction in the use of inter-

to some of the major external challenges that motivated this study,

view data (from 8% to 1%), survey data (from 12% to 10%), and the

thereby

use of multiple methods (from 15% to 13%), with the number of

advancing

our

understanding

of

the

board-strategy

relationship.

observations/process studies being very small throughout 2008–

Despite these welcome developments, the overarching insight

2020.

from this literature review suggests that the field is largely captive to

Third, and related, the majority of studies originate from either

an endogenous data-methods-theory loop hampering our understand-

the United States (49%) or Europe (28%), thus highlighting that our

ing

&

current understanding of the board-strategy relationship is limited

Talaulicar, 2017; Kumar & Zattoni, 2019; Lorsch, 2017). The attraction

of

the

field

and

contemporary

debate

(cf.

Judge

geographically to certain areas. This is also clear when we note the

of relatively simple input–output models that employ archival data

few studies that use data from multiple continents (6%). As such,

sources lead to three core problems that remain largely unchanged:

accessing relevant data from different contexts remains a (if not the)

(1) Murky conceptualizations of the phenomena; (2) data biases; and

key challenge for the field (e.g., Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007;

(3) narrow contextualization. First, conceptually there is significant

Lorsch, 2017)—and it is a challenge that appears to be growing.

fragmentation around how scholars link strategy to boards, with studies proposing alternative and oft-times competing conceptual mechanisms to explain the relationship. Even in most of the more recent
studies, the board is treated as a black box in the strategy process

4.2 | Directions for advancing board-strategy
research

(likely due to a lack of data) (Judge & Talaulicar, 2017; Lorsch, 2017),
and so the research efforts of the field yield contradictory results,

Our systematic review suggests that perhaps the greatest challenge

major differences in the application and interpretation of models, and

facing the board-strategy field is navigating the divergence in concep-

inconsistency when measuring basic constructs. For example, when

tualizations that arise from input–output approaches. To that end, we

assessing the impact of gender diversity on firm-level outcomes, dif-

would propose three distinct but interrelated themes that might

ferent scholars use the same measures as reflective of quite different

address the challenges highlighted, namely, (i) clarity on the multiple

constructs and obtain contradictory findings on the resulting relation-

levels of analysis involved in board-strategy work; (ii) the processual

ships (compare Chen et al., 2016; Chen & Kao, 2020; Elmagrhi

and temporal dimensions of the board-strategy relationship; and

et al., 2019; He & Jiang, 2019; Nadeem et al., 2020; Triana

(iii) the importance of context. All three focus on developing a greater

et al., 2014). Similar discrepancies occur when studies use the same

understanding of the generative mechanisms underpinning the board-

constructs as control, independent, mediating/moderating, or depen-

strategy relationship, albeit from slightly different perspectives.

dent variables. For instance, CEOs' power and motivation is modeled

First, scholars need to critically assess the level of analysis of

as either (i) a factor shaping strategic decision-making, or (ii) a result

board-strategy studies, a fact clearly underlined by a minority of stud-

of strategic decision-making (e.g., Devers et al., 2008; Shi et al., 2019;

ies to date. For instance, strategic decisions in and around the board-

Spraggon & Bodolica, 2011; Walters et al., 2008). Some 30 years ago,

room require the interaction of multiple individuals and groups

Pettigrew (1992, p. 170) highlighted these conceptual and methodo-

(Chen & Lai, 2017; Klarner et al., 2020; Oehmichen et al., 2017). While

logical challenges by pointing out the “inherent difficulties in separat-

the literature has, thus far, concentrated on the relationships between

ing out the multitude of endogenous and exogenous factors that

CEOs, chairs, and directors, future work could broaden this focus to

influence company performance, make the assumed effects of board

untangle the complex interplay between the various individuals and

demographic characteristics on board effectiveness very difficult

teams that are involved in the strategy process (Garg &

indeed to establish.” While there have been a limited number of indi-

Eisenhardt, 2017; Kim et al., 2009; Luciano et al., 2020). Despite some

vidual studies aimed at addressing this concern, the board-strategy lit-

headway made in this regard (Klarner et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2011),

erature as a whole has not embraced this challenge. The continued,

there is still much to do. For instance, it is not clear if this fundamental

widespread use of black box modeling is difficult to reconcile with

relationship

ongoing calls in the literature to move beyond this approach

(e.g., Hermanson et al., 2020; Yoo & Reed, 2015) or “cooperative”

(e.g., Huse, 2018; Judge & Talaulicar, 2017; Lorsch, 2017).

(Boivie et al., 2021; Fernandez & Sundaramurthy, 2020). Or, perhaps

between

boards

and

executives

is

“contested”

Second, methodologically the debate is relatively narrow, as most

more precisely, when it is contested or when it is cooperative. Related

articles use input–output models to analyze if board characteristics

to this, and following developments of practice, studies have started

are related to firm-level outcomes (62%) and rely on archival data to

to point to the dynamics between various stakeholders when boards

model relationships (69%). The last number is particularly problematic,

make strategic decisions—for instance the dynamics between board

as the large concentration on one methodological approach increases

members and owners (e.g., Ben-Amar et al., 2013; Federo et al., 2020;

the risk that shared problems associated with sample size, measure-

Oehmichen et al., 2017), or directors and company secretaries

ment, and identification (e.g., endogeneity, selection bias, and simulta-

(e.g., McNulty & Stewart, 2015; Peij & Bezemer, 2021). Similarly,

neity) will remain undetected. To address these issues, researchers

other stakeholders, like social or environmental groups and

should employ methods that present different empirical challenges

employees, may play a relevant role in the strategy decision-making
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process (e.g., Engert & Baumgartner, 2016; Nekhili et al., 2021), par-

plans (Meyfroodt & Desmidt, 2021). Recent research is also going

ticularly in light of recent developments around the importance of

beyond traditional agency-theory measures, such as CEO duality

CSR. This suggests that there is a need for more research into how

(Deman et al., 2018), to analyze if and how chair leadership (Bailey &

boards fit into a multiactor governance constellation where several

Peck, 2013) and organizational identification (Melkumov et al., 2015)

internal and external actors affect and shape the strategic decisions.

shape the board strategy contribution. Much more work is needed in

Conceptually and methodologically, this approach could explore

this space to fully understand the generative mechanisms that link

several critical questions about how individual and group inputs are

what boards do to how board characteristics shape firm-level out-

transformed (or translated) into corporate decisions and outcomes.

comes. Thus, future studies could broaden the number of social and

For example, despite the persistent use of theories (like agency the-

processual factors considered and assess holistically how board work

ory) emphasizing individual motivation (Eisenhardt, 1989), there is lit-

shapes its strategy role by simultaneously testing alternative mecha-

tle focus on how individual director motivations and behaviors

nisms. To expand traditional archival data sources, scholars may fruit-

contribute to the strategy process—for instance how their contribu-

fully exploit board minutes, record board meetings and/or use mixed

tions translate into group outcomes. Building on Parker's (2008)

or multi methods approaches (e.g., Veltrop et al., 2021).

insight that a motivated individual can influence the board strategic

A processual view of board strategic involvement also highlights

outcome, future studies should move beyond quite general effects to

the importance of its temporal dimension. The study of boards and

model the (perhaps) different impacts of individuals on different deci-

governance has long wrestled with the problems associated with

sions. Generally, there is a limited understanding of how individual

time-path dependence and feedback loops (e.g., Brennan &

director characteristics (e.g., mental health, personality, or emotional

Solomon, 2008; Pettigrew, 1992; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). The

intelligence) and behaviors (e.g., voicing, challenging others, or remain-

cyclical nature of the strategy planning, along with critical interactions

ing silent) shape a director's contributions to group strategic decision-

between actors during the process, underlines the importance of the

making (e.g., Bezemer et al., 2018; Hambrick et al., 2015; Veltrop

sequencing of events. For instance, while agency theory argues that

et al., 2021). By incorporating the multilevel nature of the strategy

boards should both ratify strategic decisions and control their imple-

process into research on boards and strategy, we could address long-

mentation (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983b), organizational behavior theo-

standing calls for a greater integration of micro and macro theories

ries (e.g., Cotton et al., 1988) suggest that board involvement in the

(Cannella & Holcomb, 2005; Dalton & Dalton, 2011; Foss, 2021) and

process would produce a better outcome. Similarly, outside of sym-

test the extent to which the often-assumed linear relationships

bolic or market sensitive announcements (like M&A or corporate spin-

between individual characteristics and group attributes are indeed lin-

offs), there is likely a substantial time delay between any board strate-

ear or more complex. While this line of research will benefit from

gic decision and the consequent corporate-level performance out-

qualitative methods, there is also scope for better modeling using

comes. While qualitative studies are well positioned to explore these

archival data. For example, in line with research on critical mass theory

temporal dynamics (see, e.g., Klarner et al., 2020), alternative quantita-

(e.g., Schwartz-Ziv, 2017; Torchia et al., 2011), future studies could

tive designs might also help to better tease out temporal effects. For

empirically examine the tipping points of when having certain types of

example, longitudinal analyses could be used to better understand

board members is (or is not) beneficial for firm strategic performance.

how and why the strategic orientations and actions of directors and

Similarly, the growing number of studies that rely on board minutes as

boards shift across time (cf. Krause, 2017; Oliver et al., 2018).

a data source (e.g., Bonini & Lagasio, 2022; Schwartz-Ziv, 2017;

Our final theme involves isolating the key contexts that appear

Tuggle et al., 2010) offer exciting opportunities to assess how individ-

important to understanding boards and strategy. Some studies

ual contributions influence group decisions.

(e.g., Cumming & Leung, 2021; García-Sánchez et al., 2021; Garg &

A second, related area for future research lies in unpacking the

Eisenhardt, 2017; Heyden et al., 2015; Zattoni et al., 2015) have

processual nature of the board-strategy phenomena. This is important,

started to conceptualize and test how the context affects the board

given that the majority of studies (i) do not empirically test whether

strategic involvement and outcomes by (i) investigating a specific cor-

their theorized mechanisms explain the proposed relationships and

porate setting, (ii) using multicountry designs, or (iii) directly modeling

(ii) do not consider and test competing mechanisms. In addition, the

institutional variations. Particularly notable is that the number of stud-

relatively few process studies show that there is a wide variety of pro-

ies from Asia (e.g., China, Japan, and Taiwan) has been increasing.

cesses that boards adopt, even when boards do have identical board

However, despite these efforts, a lot remains to be done. We have lit-

structures (see Hendry et al., 2010; Klarner et al., 2020; Parker, 2008).

tle systematic understanding of the impact of different types of con-

As Table 4 indicates, a minority of studies are moving beyond the

texts on the board-strategy relationship emerging from the literature,

standard input–output model to examine mediating relationships

a challenge noted by Pugliese et al. in 2009: “The impact of the

involved in the board's strategy work. Often building on Forbes and

national setting (e.g., the legal system, culture, and economic condi-

Milliken (1999), the small number of studies show significant variance

tions) and firm characteristics (e.g., the ownership structure, board

around the social and processual complexities involved in board

structure, firm performance, and life-cycle) on the relationship

decision-making. While some scholars investigate the role of board

between boards and strategy is not fully understood” (p. 301).

characteristics, like the nationality of directors (Du et al., 2015), others

Addressing this research gap appears timely given the strategy field

explore the artifacts of the strategy process itself, such as strategic

itself is experiencing a resurgence of history-informed research
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(Argyres et al., 2020). For the board-strategy debate, this develop-

provide a comprehensive overview of the board-strategy literature.

ment raises questions around how the socio-political and legal history

Future studies could assess to which extent the narratives and empiri-

of a region or a country shapes board strategic involvement, industrial

cal evidence vary with different levels of rigor. Fourth, we excluded

contexts gradually shape top managers and directors' mental models,

practitioner contributions as well as books or book chapters on the

and a company's history and origin influence strategic decision-making

topic, which well could have provided additional perspectives to the

processes.

academic literature we relied upon in this review. Fifth, our aim to

Practically, our review shows that the context in which boards

understand broad trends and key developments in the board-strategy

engage with strategy has been shifting. In contrast to earlier reviews

debate did not allow for documenting the unique and intricate contri-

(e.g., Deutsch, 2005; Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), our

butions that each individual article makes to the literature. We view

analysis highlights that several new research questions have (rapidly)

this literature review as a roadmap and encourage readers to go back

become prominent during the period 2008–20. For instance, as ESG-

to the articles themselves for specific details.

related themes have become a strategic-level issue for many corporations, an increasing number of studies examined how board characteristics and processes influence companies' CSR-practices and

5

|

C O N C LU D I N G R E M A R K S

performance. Similarly, as board composition has been seen as a key
issue by investors in the last two decades, many studies explored the

The past 13 years have seen the continued growth of research into

impact of more independent and diverse boards on strategic decisions

the board's involvement in firm strategy. This interest has primarily

and outcomes. Finally, the focus on gender diversity stands out,

taken the form of applying the traditional input–output model to

although the resulting findings are inconsistent. Interestingly, less

archival data, albeit with a broadening of both input (e.g., board diver-

attention has been paid to the evolving role and influence of owners

sity) and output variables (e.g., corporate social responsibility). While

and their impact on strategic decision-making processes as well as

this has moved the research agenda forward, other less popular

how boards engage with societal calls to rethink the purpose of their

research approaches relying on nonarchival data (e.g., interviews, sur-

corporation (e.g., Veldman & Willmott, 2022). Together with the need

veys) have allowed researchers to get closer to the phenomenon and

to assess the full impact of the current pandemic on the strategy role

have revealed important alternative avenues to explore. Collectively,

of boards (e.g., Zattoni & Pugliese, 2021), we think these are fruitful

these studies point to a rich diversity of dynamics, processes, and

areas for future research.

temporal and contextual factors that may confound simple and linear
input–output relationships. In addition, recent practice developments
have triggered the evolution of the board strategy role and so have

4.3

|

Limitations

offered multiple ways to advance the research agenda. We hope that
the ideas in this critical literature review will help to unlock some of

Like any study, this review has limitations. First, our samples include

these opportunities.

only journals listed in the “Business and Management,” “Business
Finance,” and “Economics” categories of the JCR database that met
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NOTES
1

We adhered to a strict coding regime to ensure consistency: While each
article was coded along five main categories, we only considered consensus to be achieved if the two independent coders agreed on the coding of each sub-category. For example: the coding of the “Theory”—one
of the categories—entailed identifying whether an article referred to one
or multiple theories. Full consensus was reached only if the coders
agreed on all the theories mentioned in the article.

2

While we use the term CEO/TMTs to indicate that these studies investigate the relationship between boards and management, it is important
to note that most of these studies focus on the relationship between
boards and CEOs.

3

All articles with an asterisk were part of the reviewed articles.
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